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This research studies whether individuals make choices consistent with expected utility
maximization in allocating wealth between a lifetime annuity and a phased withdrawal ac-
count at retirement. The paper describes the construction and administration of a discrete
choice experiment to 854 respondents approaching retirement. The experiment finds overall
rates of inconsistency with the predictions of the standard CRRA utility model of roughly
50%, and variation in consistency rates depending on the characteristics of the respondents.
Individuals with poor numeracy and with low engagement with the choice task, as measured
by scores on a task-specific recall quiz, are more likely to increase allocations to the phased
withdrawal as the risk of exhausting it increases. Individuals with higher scores on tests of
financial capability and with knowledge of retirement income products are more likely to
score high on the engagement measure, but capability and knowledge do not have indepen-
dent effects on consistent choice rates. Results suggest that initiatives to improve specific
product knowledge and to help individuals engage with decumulation decisions could be a
partial solution to the annuity puzzle.
JEL classification: G23; G28; D14




Most members of defined benefit (DB) pension plans enjoy a natural continuity in income
between work and retirement via pre-set annuity payments. By contrast, members of defined
contribution (DC) plans who want to insure against outliving their income must give up lump
sum savings in exchange for a lifetime annuity while still keeping some liquid assets to cover
uninsured events.
Despite strong theoretical support for lifetime annuity purchase (Yaari 1965; Davidoff et al.
2005; Horneff et al. 2007), the weak global demand for voluntary life annuities is a continu-
ing puzzle (Mitchell et al. 2011). The US and Australia, for example, both operate private
retirement savings schemes yet very few convert retirement accumulations to lifetime annuities:
only around 1% of US 401(k) plan retirees offered a life annuity actually purchase one (EBRI,
2011) and sales of life annuities in Australia stand at around 100 policies annually in a mar-
ket with several million retirees (Plan for Life 2012). The negligible demand for life annuities
is more surprising in Australia where virtually all workers save into mandatory individual DC
(superannuation) accounts and do not receive earnings-linked social security payments.
Academic research has not settled on a definitive explanation for the annuity puzzle. Theo-
retical studies cannot explain why even partial annuitization is rare1 and when empirical studies
show some demand for annuities it is often where the annuity is the default (Bütler and Teppa
2007; Benartzi et al. 2012).2 More recently, research has turned to behavioral or psychological
explanations, surveyed in Brown (2008) and Benartzi et al. (2012). Behavioral explanations for
a lack of interest in annuities include mental accounting and loss aversion (Hu and Scott 2007),
susceptibility to information framing (Agnew et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Cappelletti et
al. 2011; Beshears et al. 2012) and complexity (Brown et al. 2011). Here we expand on the
contributions of both conventional and behavioral research by testing how disengagement with
the retirement benefit decision affects annuity choice.
1Extensions to standard lifecycle models attribute low consumer interest in lifetime annuities to pricing issues
(Mitchell et al. 1999), crowding out (Dushi and Webb 2004), bequests (Bernheim 1991), intra family risk sharing
(Brown and Poterba 2001), demand for liquidity for uncertain health expenses (Turra and Mitchell 2008; Peijnen-
burg et al. 2010) and the option value of delay (Kingston and Thorp 2005; Milevsky and Young 2007). However,
Inkmann et al. (2011) do find theoretical support for low annuity demand for specific combinations of preference
parameters.
2For example, using Swiss pension fund data Bütler and Teppa (2007) a 90% annuity take up rate (73% full
and 17% partial) where the annuity is the default, compared with only 10% under a lump sum default.
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Much previous research assumes that ordinary people know what retirement benefit products
are available and understand how they work. However, a preliminary survey we conducted
showed scant product awareness and minimal understanding of the main insurance features of
income streams: for example, only one third of respondents had heard of a life annuity, with only
20% and 8% aware of its longevity and income guarantee characteristics. Respondents showed
similar ignorance of other retirement income products such as phased withdrawals.3
A lack of understanding is not surprising. A life annuity is a complex, one-in-a-lifetime
product, unfamiliar to most pre-retirees. The recent switch to DC plans means that there has
been limited opportunity for social learning among the current generation (Bernheim 2002).
Unlike other major financial decisions, such as house purchases, older generations have little
experience with managing an accumulation lump sum and cannot give advice. Further, the
retirement benefit decision involves high stakes (often the household’s largest non-housing asset)
and is typically made only once, often irreversibly, which prevents people learning from past
experience (Beshears et al 2008). In addition, purchasing retirement products from a menu
is a difficult financial decision usually needing immediate action but having consequences well
into the future (Beshears et al. 2008). The relationship between both financial capability and
financial outcomes (Lusardi and Mitchell 2009, 2011; Gerardi et al. 2010; Guiso and Jappelli
2008), and specific product knowledge and retirement saving decisions (Gustman et al. 2012;
Cappelletti et al. 2011), is well established. Moreover, Brown et al. (2011) confirm that
people with low financial literacy are particularly confused by life annuities. It is likely that
most ordinary members of DC plans have not learned what they really need to know about life
annuities or other retirement benefit products by the time they are ready to retire.
Motivated by the complexity of life annuities, we investigate the impact of plan member
interest and specific product understanding on the quality of retirement benefit choices, and
particularly, the demand for annuities. We design and implement a discrete choice experiment
on benefit decisions through a survey panel of 854 near-to-retirement DC plan members from
Australia. Each survey respondent chooses the percentage of financial wealth to allocate to two
retirement income streams: a liquid phased withdrawal account invested in risky assets and a life
3The survey was conducted on a representative sample of 920 Australian pre-retiree superannuation (pension)
fund members aged 50-74 and was designed to collect information about consumer awareness and understanding
of retirement income products available in the Australian market.
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annuity with or without a guarantee period. Respondents make two sets of pairwise allocations
(phased withdrawal v. life annuity, then phased withdrawal v. period certain annuity) at four
risk levels. The risk they confront is the chance of running out of money in the phased withdrawal
account before the end of life, and consequently having to live on a reduced income. Income
from the annuities is guaranteed but income from the phased withdrawal may be exhausted. The
result is two sequences of four wealth allocations revealing respondents’ changing preferences for
guaranteed income and liquidity as the risk of exhausting the liquid account increases.
We approach the annuity decision differently from previous studies. First, we do not pre-
sume that individuals approaching retirement know and understand retirement benefit products.
Instead, we show respondents a clear explanation and comparison of the alternative products
in terms of five common features. Second, rather than offering an ‘all or nothing’ annuitiza-
tion decision, we let people explore a continuum of partial annuitization options. Respondents
can trade-off the benefits of a non-annuitized product (phased withdrawal), such as access to
liquid balances and continued exposure to investment risk, against the benefits of a constant,
lifetime income stream (life annuity).4 Third, under this experimental design, where reductions
in income due to exhausting resources are significant and permanent, and respondents allocate
all financial wealth at retirement, risk aversion over income should be significant. Hence we
can evaluate whether the sequence of retirement wealth allocation decisions are consistent with
some implications of CRRA utility maximization. A simple indicator of consistency is whether
we see respondents choosing no less longevity insurance as the probability of exhausting liquid
balances before the end of life increases. This condition tests whether respondents grasp the
main insurance feature of the annuity.
Finally, in our estimation of decision consistency, we specifically measure and take account
of engagement with the experimental task. In any choice experiment, data quality depends on
respondents’ ‘real-time’ interest in the task at hand. It is likely that the choices of individuals
who are uninterested distort results. Many experiments use monetary rewards to create interest
and align incentives (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) but few embed direct tests of task engagement.
Here we introduce an individual task engagement measure: we collect scores from a short recall
4In our experiment respondents choose from a vector of allocations to each product that increase from 0% to
100% in increments of 5 percentage points. Beshears et al (2012) provide a similar setup with increments of 25
percentage points.
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quiz that tests knowledge of the five common features of the retirement products in the allocation
experiment.5 The recall quiz reviews survey-specific information about the annuities and phased
withdrawal that respondents should read just before the task. Quiz scores measure whether the
respondent is engaging with the choice task, and at the same time show how capable they
are of comparing the products effectively. If a respondent cannot recall the vital features of the
products, they are likely to be disengaged and uninformed, and less likely to meet the consistency
condition.
This experiment allows us to assess the effect of disengagement on annuitization decisions.
In particular, we show how a lack of engagement and the resultant lack of specific product
knowledge limits people’s ability to manage retirement income risk and consequently distorts
annuity choice. We also investigate how pre-existing numeracy and financial literacy help, and
to what extent. Overall the results show that pre-existing financial capability increases task
engagement, as measured by the recall quiz score, but consistent choices are directly explained
only by task engagement and numeracy. Engagement can help plan members learn the insurance
features of income stream products, so increasing their ability to perceive and manage retirement
risk.
Section 2 sets out a simple model of retirement wealth allocation used to design our discrete
choice experiment. Simulations using this model imply that certain allocation sequences should
not be observed for CRRA utility maximizers. In Section 3 we discuss the design and imple-
mentation of the on-line experiment, including the experimental task, the recall quiz designed to
test task engagement and questions that collect data on financial capability, commercial prod-
uct knowledge, health, longevity expectations, planning and demographics. Section 4 presents
our econometric model and findings. The final section reviews findings. It outlines tentative
conclusions about importance of task engagement in experimental settings, the links between
engagement and pre-existing financial capability, and the importance of both product-specific
knowledge and quantitative skills in decumulation decisions.
5This approach is informed by the idea of an Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC) as developed in Op-
penheimer et al. (2009).
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2 Analytical framework
This theoretical model sets out a simplified retirement wealth allocation problem which guides
the development of the choice experiment. We demonstrate by simulation that certain sequences
of allocations to the phased withdrawal are excluded for utility maximizing CRRA agents with
plausible preference parameters.
2.1 Theoretical model of retirement wealth allocation
Consider an individual who reaches retirement with a stock of liquid wealth w which is measured
net of the amounts set aside for bequests. At retirement this wealth is shared between a pair
of retirement benefit products, forming a portfolio (pA ∈ [0, 1], (1 − pA) = pR̃), where pAw is
allocated to a life annuity and pR̃w to a risky phased withdrawal account with return R̃t. The
chosen portfolio is fixed for the remainder of life, and the only choices made after retirement are
consumption and savings.
The timing of events is the following. At the beginning of the period t the return R̃t on the
risky asset is realized and total resources Mt composed of capital income, annuity payment y
and public pension payment pt are determined according to
Mt = R̃t (Mt−1 − ct−1) + y + pt. (1)
Then consumption ct = [0,Mt] and savings (Mt−ct) are chosen by the individual, and consump-
tion takes place. Each period t is concluded with the realization of survival process, conditional
on which the problem is repeated in the next period t+ 1.
We assume that the choice of pA is made instantly at retirement, and the first period t = 1
starts immediately afterwards, which makes it special in two respects. First, we assume that
initial wealth w already includes the realized random return on previous period’s net wealth
holding. Second, we assume that the individual is alive at t = 1 and thus the first annuity
payment is paid out with certainty.
Let πt denote the probability of survival from time period t to time period t+1. The annuity
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where r is the risk free interest rate.
Given the assumptions on period t = 1, immediately after retirement total resources are
given by M1 = pR̃tw + y. The individual chooses optimal consumption ct in every time period




[u(ct) + βπtEVt+1 (Mt+1)] , (3)
where u(ct) is the instantaneous utility of consumption, and next period’s total liquid resources
Mt+1 are given by the intertemporal budget constraint (1).
The public pension (in this context, the ‘Age Pension’) is an important part of the retirement
income system and provides inflation and longevity insurance. It offers a means-tested safety
net payout that is not dependent on an individual’s labor market history. We include it in the
budget equation (1). Assuming no labor income, the Age Pension benefit pt depends on the
previous period’s wealth (Mt−1 − ct−1) and annuity income y in the current period. Appendix
A describes the Australian institutional settings which we adapt for the current model.6
2.2 Illustration using CRRA utility
Under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility of the form u(ct) = (c
1−λ
t − 1)/(1−λ) and
reasonable parameter values, (λ = 0.5, ..., 3 and β = 0.90, 0.95) optimal allocations of retirement
wealth generated by the model for a range of individuals are presented in Figure 1.7 Other
parameters are set out in Table 1. Simulation results show that the optimal allocations to pR̃
are monotonically decreasing as the return R̃t declines through four location changes. (These
6In Australia, the Age Pension payment is means-tested but not earnings-linked and is paid to around 76% of
age-eligible residents (Harmer 2009). Eligibility for the Australian public pension depends on age, residency status,
marital status, home-ownership, income and assets. In this study, the experimental allocation task is framed as
an individual decision and respondents are screened for other eligibility factors. Age Pension treatments in the
experiments depend on intended retirement age (no pension payment is included for early retirees) and wealth
(pension payments in choice sets are adjusted by means-test tapers applied to respondents’ wealth). We do not
condition on home-ownership since 72% of respondents say they own their home.
7The model was solved numerically using the endogenous grid point method (Carroll, 2006)
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are chosen to create a range of probabilities of exhausting the phased withdrawal before the end
of life for the experiment. They are set out in Table 1.) In cases of very low risk aversion, the
optimal allocation is at the 100% boundary. The result of lower allocations to pR̃ as the return
declines holds over a wide range of wealth levels ($50,000-$1 million), when the retiree is eligible
for the public Age Pension (Figure 1, A-D) and when they are not (E). When the individual does
not receive the the public Age Pension, allocations to pR̃ decline at faster rates. Means-testing
tapers encourage eligible retirees to substitute private annuity income for the public annuity
(public Age Pension) at higher levels of wealth. This simple model serves to benchmark income
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0
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Expected gross returns of r isky product, E [R̃]
β = 0.90
λ = 0.5 λ = 1.0 λ = 1.5 λ = 3.0
β = 0.90
Figure 1: Optimal allocations to risky phased withdrawal account.
Graph shows optimal proportions of wealth at retirement allocated to the risky phased withdrawal account for
CRRA investor with relative risk aversion parameter of λ and discount factor of β = 0.9, as the location of the
risky asset return distribution changes (horizontal axis). The remaining proportion is allocated to a life annuity.
The investor is a male aged 65 at retirement with expected survival prospects consistent with cohort life tables
for Australia; see Table 1 for parameter values. Lines show A: initial wealth $50,000, in the presence of the Age
Pension; B: initial wealth $125,000, in the presence of the Age Pension; C: initial wealth $250,000, in the presence
of the Age Pension; D: initial wealth $1 million, in the presence of the Age Pension; and E: in the absence of the
Age Pension, for any level of initial wealth.
3 Experiment and survey structure
We conducted a discrete choice experiment to evaluate the consistency of retirement benefit
choices with predictions of the CRRA model.8 Pension plan data on individuals’ retirement
income product purchases could not be used for this evaluation, since revealed preference mar-
ket data may show actual choices made from among a set of alternatives and under a single
expectation of investment returns and longevity prospects, but not the same decision repeated
at different settings. While choice experiments do provide a setting to test such a proposition,
a difficulty of any experiment involving a hypothetical allocation of the entire stock of a re-
spondent’s retirement wealth, is to construct an effective incentive scheme. We cannot force
respondents to risk their whole retirement savings, and small incentives that protect against
real losses are unlikely to have the planned effect. Further, it is not at all clear how to offer an
incentive scheme that is compatible with the liquidity versus longevity risk trade-off on which
8The full dynamic survey is available at http://survey.confirmit.com/\penalty\z@{}wix/p1912625505.




The experimental task was included in a five part on-line survey that collects an array of
information about each respondent. The first part filtered ineligible respondents and sorted eli-
gible respondents into treatment groups (described below). The second part was the retirement
benefit choice experiment, followed by a recall quiz for testing task engagement. The fourth and
fifth parts collected demographic and retirement planning data, and measures of financial and
system knowledge respectively. In this section we first describe the choice experiment and then
the remainder of the survey instrument.
3.1 Choice task and consistency criteria
The discrete choice experiment asks respondents to divide their retirement wealth between pairs
of retirement benefit products in two settings. There are three products. The first product,
A (an immediate life annuity), provided a level real lifetime income stream. The annuity A
was fairly priced at a risk-free real interest rate of 2% and at improved mortality probabilities
from the most recent population life tables (Australian Government Actuary 2009). The second
product B (a phased withdrawal) creates an income stream as withdrawals from an account
invested in a diversified portfolio of assets yielding an uncertain return. The account balance
of B is of uncertain duration but unlike A is available for discretionary withdrawals. The third
product C makes guaranteed income payments for 15 years to the purchaser and/or beneficiaries
and after that makes payments as long as the purchaser is alive (Product C is product A with
a 15 year guarantee). Respondents made two sets of allocations, by comparing A with B at
different risk levels (and then C with B), and chose from a set of allocations to each product that
increased from 0% to 100% in steps of 5 percentage points. The outcome of each experimental
choice task for each respondent can be written as a percentage allocation to product B.
3.1.1 Variation in risk of exhausting phased withdrawal
When comparing products, each respondent is shown four probabilities of running out of money
in the phased withdrawal product before the end of life. These probabilities depend on the
returns distribution of the underlying investment, the rate at which income is drawn from the
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account each period and the probability of survival.9 We vary the probabilities by changing the
rate of return on the underlying investment, using four log-normal distributions of gross returns
R̃ which are indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Table 1 shows the parameters of these distributions. The
last column in Table 1 shows corresponding probabilities of exhausting B before the end of
life, calculated using the most recent current survival probabilities πt (Australian Government
Actuary 2009), and assuming level annual income draws from B at the same rate as the rate of
annuity payments.10
Table 1: Alternative risk level parameters, Male, Age 65
Risk Log-normal parameters R̃ Males, Age 65 Probability of exhausting
level i µi σi E(R̃− 1) s.d. πt rate of income draw income from B
1 0.0861 0.1357 0.100 0.15 0.953 0.067 0.10
2 0.0512 0.1404 0.063 0.15 0.953 0.067 0.25
3 0.0191 0.1449 0.030 0.15 0.953 0.067 0.50
4 -0.0111 0.1492 0.001 0.15 0.953 0.067 0.75
3.1.2 Framing of the allocation decision
Choices are framed as decisions over guaranteed and/or risky (labelled ‘expected’) annual income
streams where the probability of exhausting the risky income stream varies over four levels
from ‘very low’ (1 in 10) to ‘very high’ (3 in 4). Every choice set displays the ‘expected’ and
‘guaranteed’ minimum lifetime income associated with any selection. The guaranteed component
of income depends on allocations to A (C) and any public Age Pension entitlement. The
‘expected’ income is the sum of the guaranteed component and an annual draw-down from B,
where the rate of payout is the same as the rate of payout from A (C). The draw of income from
B had to be assumed so that the retirement benefit products could be described in terms of levels
of annual incomes and integrated with public Age Pension payments. Making the spending rate
from B equal to the rate of annuity payout means that ‘expected’ income stream is proportional
to financial wealth at retirement.
At each step in the choice sequence, respondents see the ‘expected’ and guaranteed income,
9For the experiment, the probability of exhausting this account is computed using the approximation method
of Huang et al. (2004).
10The lognormal distributions were used for calibration only and we did not provide information to respondents
about specific returns distributions or expect them to infer one.
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and the liquid wealth available for contingencies or unintentional bequest implied by their al-
location. However in each step of the sequence, the risk of a permanently lower income rises.
On seeing an increasing probability of exhausting the phased withdrawal account at the same
expected income, and hence an increasing risk of falling to a lower lifetime income, individuals
should allocate no more to B. The analysis in Section 4 evaluates whether each respondent’s se-
quence of percentage allocations to B do not increase as the risk of exhausting income from that
product rises. We label sequences of allocations that conform to this criterion as ‘consistent’.
3.1.3 Experiment instructions and design
The experiment section of the on-line survey begins with instructions, reproduced in Appendix
B, that set out a simplified retirement income plan. Respondents were asked to allocate their
retirement wealth (observed elsewhere in the survey) using what is known as a ‘product configu-
rator’ (e.g., Kamis, Koufaris and Stern, 2008), a slider that was manipulated by the respondent’s
cursor.
The experiment used a within and between subjects design. Subjects were sorted into 16
treatments groups: first by gender (2 groups), since annuity payments are lower for women
than for men because of longer life expectancy; second by predictions of financial wealth at
retirement (based on self-reported net worth), to allow for public Age Pension means-testing
(4 groups: $50K; $125K; $250K; $1 million) and to ensure that the task did not deviate too
much from experience; and finally by intended retirement age (2 groups: guaranteed incomes
of those retiring before public pension eligibility age did not include Age Pension payments).
Each participant then allocated their predicted retirement wealth in eight settings, the Cartesian
product of the four risk levels indicated in Table 1 and two pairs of products, A v. B and C v.
B.
Before they saw the choice sets, respondents read descriptions of products in terms of five
common features, Who provides this product?; How much income will I receive?; How long do
payments last?; What happens if I die? and Can I withdraw a lump sum for unforeseen events
or changes of plans? 11 Commercial product names were never mentioned. After viewing three




example choice sets, respondents were able to explore the continuum of product combinations by
clicking on the configurator, monitoring changes in expected and guaranteed income and access
to liquidity at different allocation weights, before making a final choice. A 50:50 allocation was
the default position of the configurator slider in all settings. Each choice scenario also showed
the probability that income from the phased withdrawal B would be exhausted before the end
of life, over four levels. Figure 2 illustrates a choice set at the lowest probability of exhausting
income from B.
Table 2 displays the expected and guaranteed incomes for a 25%, 50% and 75% allocation to
B for Males with and without the public Age Pension. Guaranteed income levels are comprised
of the fairly priced annuity stream ‘purchased’ at each allocation and any public Age Pension
for which the respondent was eligible. For example, a fairly priced life annuity for a 60 year old
male, (improved life expectancy of 88.64 years) pays $5.84 p.a. for each $100 of wealth allocated.
If 50% of a $50,000 retirement accumulation is allocated to the life annuity A, guaranteed income
without the Age Pension is $1,460 p.a. which explains the entry in row 3, column 5 of Table 1.
Expected income is the sum of the $1,460 income from A and another $1,460 from the allocation
of remaining wealth to B. The income amount for B assumes that income is withdrawn at a
rate equal to the annuity payout, that is at 5.84% p.a. of the wealth allocated to B.
3.2 Sample and survey context
We selected a random sample of 854 respondents from those members of the PureProfile online
panel of over 600,000 Australians who had at least one current pension plan account, were
between the ages of 50 and 64 in 2011 and who satisfied the residency requirements for the public
Age Pension. Under Australia’s Superannuation Guarantee, almost all workers between 18 and
65 years of age participate in the mandatory retirement savings system, mostly as members of
DC, privately managed, funds. Benefits are preserved until at least age 55 (rising to age 60 for
many in our sample) at which time plan members must decide how to use their accumulations.
Retirees who purchase income stream products accrue tax concessions over those who take lump




Figure 2: Illustrative choice set, Males with $1million of retirement wealth, Age Pension eligible,
lowest risk of exhausting B.
(albeit mostly non-annuitized phased withdrawal products). It follows that the choice task is
a simplified, hypothetical version of a decision that respondents will have to make in the near
future.
The first part of the survey collected demographic data (age, marital status, work status,
occupation, industry/business, education, income) including the information needed to filter
and separate respondents into the 16 treatment groups. From this information we constructed a
dichotomous covariate (Gender) coded as 1 for males and 0 for females, a dichotomous covariate
(Early retirement intention) coded as 1 for respondents intending to retire before pension age
(age 65) and 0 otherwise. Respondents answered detailed questions on asset and liability holdings
and intentional bequests. From these we constructed a polychotomous covariate for retirement
wealth ($000) (Wealth) taking values of 50 for net worth excluding the family home of less than
$50,000, 125 for net worth in the range of $50,000 to less than $200,000, 250 for net worth in
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Table 2: Indicative expected and guaranteed annual incomes in the discrete choice experiment:
Males, comparing A and B.
Allocation to Phased Withdrawal B
Age Pension included No Age Pension
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Financial Wealth $50K
Expected income ($p.a.) 22, 340 22, 340 22, 340 2, 920 2, 920 2, 920
Guaranteed income ($p.a.) 21, 490 20, 650 19, 810 2, 190 1, 460 730
Financial Wealth $125K
Expected income ($p.a.) 27, 400 27, 400 27, 400 7, 300 7, 300 7, 300
Guaranteed income ($p.a.) 25, 290 23, 180 21, 070 5, 470 3, 650 1, 820
Financial Wealth $250K
Expected income ($p.a.) 34, 560 33, 860 33, 150 14, 590 14, 590 14, 590
Guaranteed income ($p.a.) 31, 630 27, 400 23, 180 10, 940 7, 300 3, 650
Financial Wealth $1,000K
Expected income ($p.a.) 75, 430 72, 360 69, 290 58, 370 58, 370 58, 370
Guaranteed income ($p.a.) 64, 090 49, 680 35, 270 43, 780 29, 190 14, 590
the range of $200,000 to less than $600,000 and 1000 for higher. The second part of the survey
was the retirement benefits choice task (including product descriptions, configurator explanation
and the choice scenarios).
In the third survey section, respondents answered 18 true/false questions that tested their
recall of the five features of A, B and C presented in the retirement benefit product descrip-
tions.12 From these answers we calculated the proportion of correct answers(Quiz ). We believe
this is a reasonable measure of engagement with the choice task for the following reasons: first,
to answer correctly respondents must read and understand the experiment-specific product de-
scriptions; second, A, B and C are not labeled with the names of existing commercial income
stream products, so respondents cannot answer the quiz correctly from their ex ante ‘real world’
product knowledge without reading the descriptions; and third, we know from pilot survey re-
12The quiz required that respondents check all of the following that apply to each of the products A, B and C:
1. I can withdraw a lump sum for unforseen events; 2. If I die, payments stop; 3. I will receive a regular income
for as long as I live; 4. My account balance will fluctuate with financial markets; 5. Payments are guaranteed to
me or my beneficiaries for the first 15 years; 6. None of these apply. The answer to question 2 for C is ambiguous
so those responses were omitted from the total score.
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sponses that awareness of retirement benefit products is very low.13 In Section 4 we show that
not paying attention to the descriptions of A, B and C makes consistent choices less likely.
Following the recall quiz, respondents answered questions on retirement planning and expec-
tations, bequest intentions, precautionary savings intentions, plans to liquidate housing wealth,
mortality and morbidity expectations and current quality of life. The questions from this section
that are included our final model are detailed in Appendix C. From these answers we constructed
a continuous covariate (Subjective life expectancy) measuring the deviation of the respondent’s
subjective life expectancy from that predicted by the Australian Life Tables. Positive values
indicate optimistic subjective survival expectations. We also constructed a polychotomous co-
variate for the financial aspects of retirement planning (Retirement financial planning) taking
the values 0, 1, 2, ..., 6 as the level of planning increased from ‘I haven’t thought at all about
what I will need for retirement’ to ‘I have a firm idea of what I need and I’m on track to reach
it’. As well we computed each respondent’s mean score across the five dimensions of quality of
life (mobility, self care, usual activities, pain and anxiety/depression) where 1 is very low and 3
is very high quality (Quality of Life).
The final part of the survey consists of questions measuring numeracy and financial literacy
skills, as well as self-assessed knowledge of finance, use of financial advice, trust in financial
service providers and awareness and knowledge of existing retirement income products.14 We
construct covariates (Numeracy, Basic Literacy and Sophisticated Literacy) as the proportion
of correct responses to each group of questions. Self-assessed financial literacy (Self-assessed
Literacy) is measured on a scale of 1-7 with 7 meaning very high understanding. Finally, we
create a covariate (Commercial product knowledge) as the proportion of correct answers in a
set of questions testing awareness of and detailed knowledge of real world retirement income
products. (See Appendix C.)
13Other possible proxies for task engagement, such as the number of times respondents ‘clicked’ to explore the
configurator or the time spent completing the task, are likely to be noisier measures. For example, a person who
understands products A and B well, perceives the risk of ruin accurately and who sees the income information may
click few times on the allocation scale, having clear preferences. Similarly, time can be confounded by random
distractions. Our recall quiz is similar to the Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC) of Oppenheimer et al.
(2009), where satisficing survey participants who are not following instructions are identified.
14The three numeracy questions and four financial literacy questions, detailed in Appendix B, are drawn from
Lipkus et al. (2001) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2009). Numeracy questions test proportions, percentages and
simple probability; two basic financial literacy questions test interest and inflation and two sophisticated financial
literacy questions test diversification.
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From this information we selected numeracy, tested and subjectively assessed financial liter-
acy, product knowledge, current quality of life, subjective survival expectations, financial aspects
of retirement planning and the treatment indicators (gender, wealth and retirement intentions)
as covariates in the model to be discussed in Section 4. The selection was based on preliminary
estimations confirming that other potentially important covariates including age, formal educa-
tion, marital status, occupation, health expectations, bequest intentions, precautionary savings
intentions, detailed knowledge of the public pension and plans to leave the workforce, were not
relevant.
4 Econometric model and findings
We investigate the rate at which respondents choose consistently with standard expected utility
model predictions, as a function of task engagement and the covariates just described. The 854
complete responses are made up of four allocations between products A and B and four between
C and B, making 6, 832 in total. The first panel in Table 3 shows the average percentage
allocation to phased withdrawal B over life annuity A for each of the 16 treatment groups as
the risk of exhausting B rose from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’. The second panel shows average
percentage allocation to B over life annuity with guarantee, C.
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Table 3: Average Percentage of Retirement Wealth Allocated to Phased Withdrawal
Financial Wealth at Retirement
$50K $125K $250K $1000K
Risk level 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
A versus B
Male
Retire < 65 years 48 51 45 44 50 41 37 40 52 51 46 40 54 53 44 43
Retire ≥ 65 years 49 49 41 44 53 54 45 44 49 48 39 38 46 46 45 42
Female
Retire < 65 years 45 50 44 44 46 51 40 41 54 48 42 35 55 52 48 51
Retire ≥ 65 years 51 52 49 42 52 52 46 45 52 47 49 40 54 54 53 52
C versus B
Male
Retire < 65 years 48 45 37 38 54 51 45 45 51 50 39 37 55 54 48 44
Retire ≥ 65 years 45 47 42 40 50 49 43 37 52 46 37 35 49 49 44 46
Female
Retire < 65 years 49 43 46 41 50 46 43 37 53 55 45 44 57 47 45 42
Retire ≥ 65 years 51 51 47 43 52 51 43 42 49 49 43 43 53 53 49 48
No. respondents
Male
Retire < 65 years 31 27 50 57
Retire ≥ 65 years 63 54 63 40
Female
Retire < 65 years 45 33 55 38
Retire ≥ 65 years 115 79 66 38
Notes: Top panel shows average percentage of wealth allocated by respondents in each treatment group to B
over A at risk of exhausting income from B of (1) 1 in 10, (2) 1 in 4, (3) 1 in 2 to (4) 3 in 4. Product A is an
immediate indexed lifetime annuity; product B is a phased withdrawal. Second panel shows average percentage
of wealth allocated to B over C as risk increases. Product C is an immediate indexed lifetime annuity with a 15
year guarantee period. Lower panel shows number of respondents in each treatment group.
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Table 3 shows generally decreasing average allocations to B as risk rises, consistent with risk
aversion. Declines are more regular for the early retirement treatment groups (Retire < 65). For
these respondents, choice set displays of ‘guaranteed incomes’ did not include the public Age
Pension and consequently income reductions due to exhausting B were more conspicuous.
4.1 Inconsistency rates
We assume independence across respondents in the analysis. Each respondent r makes an
allocation to A and B (C and B) at each risk level i = 1, 2, 3, 4. We index the pairwise product
comparisons as f = 1, 2. For each respondent r, decisions over risk levels i in comparison sets f
result in two 4× 1 vectors of allocations to product B. If these vectors are non-increasing in the
percentage allocated to B as i rises, the respondent recognizes increasing risk and conforms with
our simple CRRA utility model. Respondents who do not conform may be missing or ignoring
one main benefit of purchasing an annuity. We treat the dichotomous outcome of violating
this condition as a random variable where P (v
(f)
r = 1) = p(f), for f = 1, 2. We label this the
independent response (IR) model.
The first column of Table 4 presents the estimates of p(f) for all respondents using only
counts of consistency: around one half of respondents increased their allocation to the phased
withdrawal (product B) as risk increased in both the A v.B and C v. B allocation tasks (the
weak condition). However, the condition that respondents choose a non-increasing percentage
allocation to B does not rule out respondents who always choose 50:50 allocations. The second
column of Table 4 presents estimates of p(f) where v
(f)
r = 1 is assigned to respondents who violate
the condition or who do not move the slider away from the default at all (the strong condition).
The standard error of each element in Table 4 is about 0.017 so the rates of inconsistency at
f = 2 are significantly lower than at f = 1. Respondents may have become more familiar with
the experimental task in the second round of choices and consequently made fewer errors. They
may also have preferred C to A.
In complex financial choices attentiveness and engagement are critical. Subjects bring their
own personal financial capability, expectations and other demographic characteristics to the
choice experiment. Of these, gender, wealth and retirement intentions are used here to sort
respondents into treatment groups. During the task, respondents will also be more or less
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Table 4: Probabilities of inconsistent allocation sequences in sets A−B and C −B
Weak condition Strong condition
p(1) 0.555 0.717
p(2) 0.484 0.645
Note: Table shows estimate of IR probability of inconsistent allocations. The weak condition for conformity is
satisfied where the percentage of wealth allocated to B never increases as i rises. The strong condition adds the
requirement that respondents move the slider at least once, either to explore the choice set or make an allocation.
engaged, attending to instructions and information, maintaining attention and thinking through
the choices with varying intensities. Pre-determined financial capability could influence choices
both directly and indirectly: directly by enabling ‘consistent’ choice and indirectly by motivating
task engagement which then promotes consistent choices. Engagement is likely to be affected
by capability but is also endogenous to the choice task itself and hence potentially a predictor
of inconsistency.
We propose a triangular structure to model choices. The structure has two components:
the first determines endogenous task engagement conditional on a vector of pre-determined re-
spondent characteristics and the second estimates the probability of inconsistency conditional
on the vector of pre-determined characteristics and the measure of endogenous task engage-
ment. We call this the conditionally independent response model (CIR) where the probability
of inconsistent choices is independent of r and f but conditional on treatments and covariates.
We estimate the following recursive system of equations:
Quizr = β
′
1xr + εr (4)
Pr(vr = 1) = Λ(β
′




where Quizr is the proportion of the recall quiz questions answered correctly by respondent r
(i.e., our measure of task engagement); xr is a vector of pre-determined variables measuring
numeracy, financial product knowledge, financial literacy, subjective financial understanding,
retirement finance planning, subjective life expectancy, quality of life, and treatment group
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variables including gender, intended retirement age and wealth; and εr is an independent error
term.15
Estimation results show that pre-existing financial capability and several measures of atti-
tudes and expectations predict task engagement (as proxied by success in the recall quiz Quizr).
Table 5 reports OLS estimation of equation 4.16 Preliminary analysis showed that the mean
score for engagement was 73% with a minimum of 29% and maximum of 100% with a standard
deviation of 18%. Using the estimates from Table 5, we find that two additional correct answers
in the numeracy questions or basic financial literacy (interest and inflation) questions increased
the engagement score by about 8 percentage points and by slightly less for the sophisticated
literacy (diversification) questions. A 50% increase in correct commercial product knowledge or
a score in the upper half of the retirement financial planning range also accounts for a similar in-
crease in engagement. An intention to retire before age 65 increases engagement by 2 percentage
points; a 20 year increase in subjective life expectancy has a similar impact. On the other hand,
males, respondents with higher reported wealth, those currently enjoying a high quality of life
and those with a higher level of self-assessed financial literacy were significantly less engaged.
Table 5: Estimated coefficients for Equation 4
Dependent variable: Quiz Coef S.E p-value
Gender -0.028∗∗ 0.012 0.017
Wealth -0.00004∗∗ 0.000 0.016
Early retirement intention 0.020∗ 0.012 0.087
Numeracy 0.113∗∗ 0.018 0.000
Basic financial literacy 0.074∗∗ 0.020 0.000
Sophisticated financial literacy 0.064∗∗ 0.017 0.000
Self-assessed financial literacy -0.010∗∗ 0.005 0.038
Commercial product knowledge 0.167∗∗ 0.037 0.000
Retirement financial planning 0.017∗∗ 0.003 0.000
Quality of life -0.056∗ 0.022 0.012
Subjective life expectancy 0.001∗ 0.001 0.077
Constant 0.703∗∗ 0.064 0.000
R-squared 0.229
Notes: ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. * Statistically significant at the 10% level. Sample size: 854.
15The assumption underlying equation 5 is that the random utility of irrational choice is U(vr = 1) = β
′
2xr +
ψQuizr + νr where νr is i.i.d. Gumbel distributed with scale equal to one, and is independent of εr.
16We do not constrain the right hand side of 4 to lie between zero and one even though the dependent variable
is a proportion. The intention is to understand the explanatory power of exogenous variables on Quizr.
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The second part of the model now uses engagement and the covariates from equation 4 to
estimate the probability that respondents choose inconsistently. Table 6 shows the estimated
odds ratios from the CIR models described in equation 5. The dependent variables, vfr were equal
to one when the respondent increased allocation to B (phased withdrawal) as i (risk) increased or
failed to move slider at least once (strong condition on consistency). Since each CIR model nests
the corresponding IR model, we use a standard likelihood ratio test of the restriction implied
by the IR models. The test statistics are 44.8 and 39.60 respectively. Using the conventional
chi-square asymptotic distribution of this test statistic with 12 degrees of freedom (each βf
is 13 × 1), the restriction that βf = 0 is rejected. In other words, probabilities depend on
respondents’ capabilities and engagement levels.
The odds ratios in Table 6 show the change in
Pr(vfr = 1 | xr, Quizr)/[1− Pr(vfr = 1 | xr, Quizr)] (6)
of a one-unit increase in the indicated covariate. For example, for comparisons between A and
B (f = 1), the odds ratio for numeracy is 0.501, which is significantly different from 1.0 at the
5% level. Two more correct answers in the numeracy instrument reduces the odds (equation 6)
of an inconsistent allocation pattern by a factor of 0.5010.667 = 0.631: if, at the lowest numeracy
score of 0, the other covariates indicate the probability of inconsistent choices is 0.50, then
the probability decreases to 0.501/(1 + 0.501) = 0.334 when all three questions are answered
correctly.17
Task engagement (Quiz score) is more important than numeracy in the conditional proba-
bility of inconsistent choices. If, in a situation where the engagement score is zero (no answers
correct) and the other covariates imply the probability of inconsistent choice is 0.5, the proba-
bility of inconsistency falls to 0.06 if the engagement score rises to one (all answers correct) for
a respondent allocating wealth between A and B. The effect is still strong, though somewhat
moderated, for the C−B comparison, where the same probability would fall from 0.5 to 0.28 as
engagement score rose from zero to one. So respondents who understand the differences between
17Existing research has established a connection between poor numeracy and mortgage defaults (Gerardi et al.
2010), inefficient consumer credit decisions (Agarwal and Mazumder 2011), lower risk tolerance, impatience, more
errors in economic decisions (Burks et al. 2009) and susceptibility to framing (Peters and Levin 2008).
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the retirement products can make sound choices.
Surprisingly, other variables that were significant in equation 4 (i.e., financial literacy, com-
mercial product knowledge and retirement financial planning) are not directly relevant to in-
consistency rates. Only numeracy and task engagement are significant. To summarize, strong
financial literacy, general financial knowledge and a tendency to plan motivate individuals to
engage in the task, but it is a clear understanding of the specific features of the choice at hand,
and basic numerical ability, that ultimately drives consistent retirement benefit allocations.
Table 6: Estimated odds ratios for CIR equations 5
f = 1 f = 2
Quiz score 0.117∗∗ 0.401∗∗
Gender 1.154 0.796
Wealth 1.000 1.000
Early retirement intention 1.32 1.151
Numeracy 0.501∗∗ 0.490∗∗
Basic financial literacy 1.312 1.115
Sophisticated financial literacy 1.130 0.668
Self-assessed financial literacy 0.993 1.019
Retirement financial planning 0.952 0.938
Quality of life 0.543 0.795
Subjective life expectancy 1.001 0.998
Pseudo R2(McFadden) 0.044 0.036
Notes: Dependent variable vfr = 1 when respondent increased allocation to B (phased withdrawal) as i (risk)
increased or failed to move slider at least once (strong condition on consistency). (1) is comparison A−B and
(2) is comparison C −B. ** Statistically significant estimated coefficient at the 5% level. * Statistically
significant estimated coefficient at the 10% level. Sample size: 854.
Although the CIR model is more general than the IR model, it still imposes the restriction
that apart from the covariates included in the model, decisions over retirement income products
are independent between f = 1, 2. Under this restriction, collecting further details of individual’s
attitudes to investment and longevity risk would be unnecessary to anyone advising on retirement
financial planning. However, it is more likely that individual heterogeneity matters to decisions
beyond the inventory measured by model covariates so far.
We make a formal test of the restriction that unobserved individual heterogeneity is unim-
portant to consistency, within the limits of the current model, by generalizing the CIR model
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to allow for conditionally dependent responses (CDR). The unrestricted model is:
Pr(v1r = m1, v
2
r = m2) = mL(γ, xr, Quizr), (7)
where the expression on the right side of equation 7 denotes a multinomial logit model with
parameter vector γ. There are 22 = 4 outcomes (m1,m2), and so the multinomial logit model
has (4− 1)× 13 = 39 coefficients. Estimates of these coefficients, reported in Table 7 are largely
consistent with Table 6. Coefficients on engagement and numeracy are of a similar sign and
size, though fewer are statistically significant than for the binomial logit CIR model. Other
covariates remain insignificant, with one exception among the 39 estimated parameters.
Table 7: Estimated odds ratios for CDR equation7
consistentf = 1&2 consistentf = 1 consistentf = 2
Quiz score 11.471∗∗ 6.546∗∗ 1.263
Gender 0.992 0.914 1.487∗∗
Wealth 1.000 1.000 1.000
Early retirement intention 0.723 0.783 0.943
Numeracy 3.250∗∗ 1.361 1.556
Basic Literacy 0.827 0.647 0.819
Sophisticated Literacy 1.204 0.790 1.665
Self-assessed Literacy 1.018 0.948 0.930
Retirement financial planning 1.075 1.074 1.089
Quality of life 1.778 2.182 1.206
Subjective life expectancy 1.002 0.994 1.000
Pseudo R2(McFadden) 0.037
Notes: vfr = 1 when respondent increased allocation to B (phased withdrawal) as i (risk) increased or failed to
move slider at least once (strong condition on consistency). Group 1 are consistent in A v.B and C v.B
comparisons; Group 2 are consistent in A v.B and inconsistent in C v.B comparisons; Group 3 are inconsistent
in A v.B and consistent in C v.B comparisons; and reference level Group 4 are inconsistent in A v.B and C v.B
comparisons. ** Statistically significant estimated coefficient at the 5% level. * Statistically significant
estimated coefficient at the 10% level. Sample size: 854.
Given any set of coefficient vectors βf from binomial logit CIR models, there is a coefficient
vector γ in the multinomial logit CDR model such that
mL(γ,x, Quiz) = fL(β1, x, Quiz) · fL(β2, x, Quiz))
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for all possible (x, Quiz). Since the CDR model nests the CIR model, the maximum of the log
likelihood function in the CDR model cannot be smaller than the sum of the maximums of the
log likelihood functions in the two corresponding CIR models. The sum of the log likelihoods of
the CIR models is -1022.3 compared with -981.89 for the CDR model implying a test statistic
of 80.81. Using the conventional chi-square asymptotic distribution of this test statistic with
13 degrees of freedom (γ is 39 × 1, each βf is 13 × 1), the hypothesis of independence across
the two choice scenarios is rejected. In other words, idiosyncratic variation is still important to
retirement benefit choice patterns even after allowing for an array of demographic and capability
measures.
5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper studies the behavior of individuals as they allocate retirement wealth between a life-
time annuity and a phased withdrawal. This is an increasingly prevalent, yet complex, decision
in a DC world where retirement savers bear responsibility to turn lump sum benefits into lifetime
income. Most existing research assumes that people know about retirement income products
and have a basic grasp of how they function. We investigate the impact of disengagement and
poor understanding of products on the quality of allocations. Specifically, we measure how well
retirement plan members manage an increasing risk of running out of liquid wealth before the
end of life: respondents who reduce their exposure to this rising risk by maintaining or increasing
annuitization turn out to be engaged respondents who know how the products work.
Our analysis of retirement benefit choices can be described as follows:
1. A large minority of respondents choose consistently with predictions of a simple CRRA
utility maximization model by not increasing allocations of retirement wealth to the phased
withdrawal product as the probability of exhausting it increases. The remainder increase
their allocation to the phased withdrawal product even in the face of an increasing proba-
bility of permanently reducing income before the end of life. Inconsistency rates are lower
where the phased withdrawal product is paired with the annuity with 15 year guarantee
than where the guarantee is absent.
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2. Respondents with higher financial capability (numeracy, financial literacy, and commercial
product knowledge) pay more attention to new information about the retirement products
and recall that information better when tested (measured using a post task quiz). For ex-
ample, two additional correct responses in the numeracy or basic financial literacy (interest
and inflation) questions improve scores in a quiz on the annuity and phased withdrawal
products by about one standard deviation.
3. However, financial capability is only indirectly connected with consistent choices, with
only numeracy having a direct, positive impact on the likelihood of rational choices over
and above its indirect effect on engagement with the choice task.
4. Task engagement (and numeracy) increase the probability that subjects will choose in a
consistent manner: at maximum engagement (measured by the number of correct answers
in the post task recall quiz of product features), the probability of inconsistent choices
declines by 90% compared with a zero engagement score, while raising numeracy from
minimum to maximum scores reduces the probability of inconsistency by around 40%.
Therefore, while strong financial literacy, general financial knowledge and a tendency to
plan can motivate individuals to engage in the task, it is a clear understanding of the
specific features of the choice at hand and basic numerical ability that enables better
allocation decisions. However, tests of dependence indicate that unobserved individual
heterogeneity is also important.
Our findings have several implications for policy makers and providers of retirement income
products. First, while revealed preference data suggest people show scant interest in annuity
products, our allocation task shows much more interest when products are described by their
characteristics, rather than their commercial names. In the experiment described here, where
respondents are given descriptions of products in terms of five common features (but no product
names), a majority say that they would fully or partially annuitize their retirement accumulation.
Revealed preference data is often used by government to support inaction in policy development
and by the financial services industry to justify a lack of product innovation. Our study suggests
that both government and industry need to take more care to explain the key insurance features
of alternative retirement benefit products before dismissing then as not interesting to consumers.
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Second, our study tests how financial competence (numeracy and financial literacy, and
commercial product knowledge) can help people understand reasonably simple retirement benefit
product information. We find that those with more competence are more engaged, and the more
engaged are more likely to make ‘better’ decisions. While we cannot unequivocally translate
‘engagement’ with the hypothetical task to ‘real world’ engagement with the retirement benefit
decision, our findings do suggest improving the financial skills and product knowledge of real
world retirement savers might help, as recommended in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) and Clark
et al. (2011) among others. The challenge is how to improve ’real world’ financial literacy and
commercial product knowledge of retirement savers through both education and improved benefit
product information formats. Finally, an overall implication of this study is that disengagement
with the retirement benefit decision could provide a partial solution to the annuity puzzle.
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The Age Pension benefit pt is
pt(Mt) = max (0, FP −max (ITt, ATt)) , (8)
where FP is the maximum payment, assumed constant in the model, and ITt and ATt are
reductions due to income and asset tests respectively. At the time of the experiment, the
maximum annual payment was $18,961.80 for single pensioners.
The income test induces a 50% offset in the maximum payment for every dollar received above
a certain threshold (ĪT ). Different sources of income (I) are treated differently for the purpose
of the income test, so that returns to financial investments are deemed at a fixed progressive
rate, while incomes from long-term income stream products (including annuities) are reduced
by returns of capital. The asset test induces a 3.9% offset in in the maximum payment for every
dollar in assets above a certain threshold (ĀT ). For the purposes of this test, financial assets
are assessed at their market value, and income stream products are assessed at their residual










It+1 = DR2 (Mt − ct)− (DR2 −DR1)min
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where for simplicity we are treating investable wealth as financial investments and LE1 is life
expectancy at time t = 1. Deeming rates at the time of the experiment were DR1 = 3% and















where ĀT = 181, 750.00A$ p.a. for singles.
Under the assumption of no labor income, both tests in (8) depend primarily on the previous
period’s wealth, Mt − ct, and the annuity component of the portfolio, pA. Because the annuity
provides lower assessable income (under the income test) and is counted only at a fraction of its
purchase price (under the asset test), allocating more of the retirement wealth to the annuity
shifts both income and asset test tapers to the right, resulting in higher public Age Pension for
a given amount of initial wealth. (See Figure 3.)
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Income and asset testing of age pension
 
 
Age pension: 0% annuity, 100% risky asset
Asset test
Income test
Age pension: 50% annuity, 50% risky asset
Asset test
Income test
Age pension: 100% annuity, 0% risky asset
Asset test
Income test




“In the next few questions we will ask you to complete 4 sets of choice tasks about 2 financial
products.
On leaving the workforce, most people need to use money from their superannuation and
other savings to cover their spending. Industry and Government are looking for simple financial
products to help Australians manage their superannuation and savings during retirement.
The retirement income products we are going to show you are designed by large financial
firms, like insurance companies and superannuation funds, to cover spending and manage finan-
cial risks in retirement.
Product A: Get a guaranteed income.
• Who provides this product?
– It is supplied by large life insurance firms. These firms have to meet strict government
regulations to be allowed to sell this product.
• How much income will I receive?
– You will receive a fixed regular income.
• How long do payments last?
– You will receive the regular income for as long as you live, regardless of how long or
short that is.
• What happens if I die?
– If you die, payments stop.
• Can I withdraw a lump sum for unforeseen events or changes of plans?
– No. To purchase this product, you pay a lump sum to the insurance firm in exchange
for the income stream and you cannot get it back. Your beneficiaries do not get the
lump sum back if you die.
33
Product B: Withdraw a regular income.
• Who provides this product?
– It is supplied by superannuation funds. Your money is held in an account and invested
in financial assets like shares and bonds.
• How much income will I receive?
– You can decide how much of your balance to withdraw each year. Your account
balance will fluctuate each year with financial markets. You will pay fees each year
to the fund that manages your account.
• How long do payments last?
– There is no guarantee you will have a lifetime income. How long payments last
depends on investment returns, fees and your withdrawals.
• What happens if I die?
– If you die, remaining money in your account goes to your dependents or your estate.
• Can I withdraw a lump sum for unforeseen events or changes of plans?
– Yes. You can take all or a part of any remaining money out, but if you do it will not
be available to pay you income in the future.”
Respondents were then shown several examples of the product configurator and completed
four choices. After that they saw another screen: “Thank you for completing the last 4 tasks.
Now we want you to compare Product B with a different type of guaranteed income product in
another 4 similar tasks.
Product C: Get a guaranteed income with a fixed term payment period.
• Who provides this product?
– It is supplied by large life insurance firms. These firms have to meet strict government
regulations to be allowed to sell this product.
• How much income will I receive?
– You or your beneficiaries will receive a fixed regular income.
• How long do payments last?
– You personally will receive the regular income for as long as you live, regardless of
how long or short that is. If you die within the fixed term period, the regular income
continues to be paid to your beneficiaries or estate up to the end of the 15th year.
• What happens if I die?
– Payments are guaranteed to you or your beneficiaries for the first 15 years, even if
you die within that period. Payments are guaranteed only to you after that time.
• Can I withdraw a lump sum for unforeseen events or changes of plans?
– No. To purchase this product, you pay a lump sum to the insurance firm in exchange
for the income stream and you cannot get it back. Your beneficiaries do not get the




• To what age do you think you will live?
• What is your current age?
Financial aspects of retirement planning question:
• Which of the following statements best describes your thoughts about the financial aspects
of retirement?
1. I haven’t thought at all about what I will need for retirement
2. I have just started to think about what I will need in terms of savings for retirement,
but haven’t checked out my current financial position.
3. I have thought about it a fair bit, and have checked out my current financial position.
4. I have some firm ideas about what I will need and have compared my current position
with my idea of what I will need.
5. I have a firm idea of what I need but I’m not sure if I can reach it, and haven‘t
planned a way to get there.
6. I have a firm idea of what I need, I’m not sure if I can reach it, but I have planned a
way to get there.
7. I have a firm idea of what I need and I’m on track to reach it.
Quality of Life questions:
• Mobility
1. I am confined to bed
2. I have SOME PROBLEMS walking around
3. I have NO PROBLEMS walking around
• Self-care
1. I CANNOT wash or dress myself
2. I have SOME PROBLEMS washing or dressing myself
3. I have NO PROBLEMS with self-care
• Activities
1. I CANNOT do my usual activities
2. I have SOME PROBLEMS doing my usual activities
3. I have NO PROBLEMS doing all my usual activities
• Pain/Discomfort
1. I have A LOT of pain or discomfort
2. I have MODERATE pain or discomfort
3. I have NO pain or discomfort
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• Anxiety/Depression
1. I’m VERY anxious or depressed
2. I’m MODERATELY anxious or depressed
3. I’m NOT anxious or depressed
Self-assessed financial literacy
• On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means very low and 7 means very high, how would you assess
your understanding of finance?
Numeracy:
• Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times
do you think the die would come up with even numbers?
• In a lottery, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best guess about how
many people would win a $10 price if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket to the lottery.
• In a raffle, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets in the raffle
win a car?
Financial Literacy:
• Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After
5 years how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to
grow?
• Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was
2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this
account?
• When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing money?
• Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. ‘Buying a single company’s shares
usually provides a safer return than a share managed fund.’
Commercial product knowledge
Respondents were asked the following:
Below is a list of features for products. For each product listed..., please select all product
features that you think apply to each product. Please select all that apply for each product... that
you have heard of.
The products surveyed were:
• Allocated (or account-based) pension
• Lifetime annuity
• Term certain annuity
• CPI Indexed lifetime annuity
• Single lifetime annuity with reversion
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• Guaranteed lifetime annuity
• Transition to retirement pension
• None of these
The features surveyed were:
• To purchase this product, I pay a lump sum of my capital and do not get it back.
• My capital is tied up for a fixed term.
• My account balance will go up and down with the financial markets.
• I can choose the amount of income I withdraw, as long as I withdraw the minimum required
by the government.
• I can withdraw my capital/ balance at any time or leave it to someone in my will.
• The dollar amount of my capital is guaranteed not to go down.
• I can choose where my money is invested.
• The dollar amount of my income is guaranteed not to go down.
• My income is guaranteed to increase with inflation.
• The value of my capital is guaranteed to increase with inflation.
• Income from this product lasts my whole life regardless of how long I live.
• If I die, my partner can receive the income from this product.
• If I die, my partner or beneficiaries can receive the capital/balance from this product.
Consistency definitions used are:
1. Non-increasing allocation to the phased withdrawal product B for all four choices in A
versus B and move the slider at least once (1).
2. Non-increasing allocation to the phased withdrawal product B for all four choices in C
versus B and move the slider at least once (2).
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